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the arctic couNcil: gatekeePer or doormat 
to the world’s Next maJor resource Battle? 
by Oded Cedar* 
It has long been said that “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”1 If history indeed repeats itself, then all indicators suggest that the global community 
is ripe for another major “land grab.”2 This time, the land at issue 
is the Arctic3 and the bounty is the abundant oil and natural gas 
reserves trapped beneath its surface.4 
Over the last decade, a coalescence of different factors has 
shifted the search for natural resources such as oil and gas to the 
Arctic.5 Advances in exploration, drilling, and extraction tech-
nologies have helped mitigate the traditionally cost-prohibitive 
factors of developing ice-locked reserves.6 Geopolitical concerns 
about the waning global supply of oil and gas have also driven 
countries to explore for these resources in the Arctic.7 However, 
the primary force behind this focus is the undeniable fact that the 
Earth’s changing climate is melting away the Arctic’s ice sheet 
and permafrost, making the region’s oil and gas reserves acces-
sible for the first time.8 
The Arctic Council (“AC” or “Council”) is a leading forum 
for the dialogue on the development of natural resources in the 
region.9 This intergovernmental body is comprised of eight 
member-nations, all of which border the Arctic Circle.10 The 
Council also includes six “permanent-observer” nations11 who, 
though they have no voting rights, can participate and contrib-
ute to the work of the Council.12 The AC’s stated mission is to: 
“promot[e] cooperation, coordination, and interaction among 
the Arctic States . . . on common Arctic issues, in particular [on] 
issues of sustainable development and environmental protection 
in the Arctic.”13 
The AC’s mission stems from the Ottawa Declaration, which 
established the AC in 1996.14 This document avows the commit-
ment of AC member-nations to seek “sustainable development 
in the Arctic region including conservation and sustainable use 
of natural resources.”15 This language from the Ottawa Declara-
tion incorporates the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
(“AEPS”) that was instrumental the Council’s creation.16 Thus, 
the impetus behind the AEPS and the AC makes it reasonable to 
expect as well as demand some action from the Arctic Council 
to oversee and regulate the development of fossil fuels in the 
Arctic.17 
Despite its benevolent mission and establishing documents, 
the AC has in actuality provided a forum for member-nations 
to lay the groundwork for unsustainable fossil fuel development 
in the Arctic.18 Most recently, the Danish ambassador to China 
noted his strong support for China’s inclusion into the AC as a 
permanent-observer nation.19 This move garnered speculation 
from scholars and analysts, who noted China’s aid to Denmark 
in the development of Greenland’s natural resources, and China’s 
interest in Arctic resources since 2004.20 Canada is an especially 
vocal claimant, touting the country’s long-standing sovereignty 
over certain areas in the Arctic, and further expressing the coun-
try’s intent to exercise its sovereignty in documents published 
with the AC.21 Other actions by the AC member-nations outside 
of the forum, like Russia’s placement of a national flag on the 
Arctic’s ocean floor, presumably stir echoes through the AC.22 
At one point or another, every member nation of the AC has 
published reports with the council, expressing their plans to 
exercise sovereignty over the region and to develop its fossil fuel 
resources.23 
These national assertions make fossil fuel extraction in the 
Arctic seemingly expected and inevitable.24 However, the AC 
member-nations’ plans for fossil fuel extraction contradict their 
commitment to protecting the Arctic environment expressed in 
the Ottawa Declaration.25 In addition to worsening the effects 
of climate change, unchecked oil and gas development can have 
direct, catastrophic environmental consequences. For example, 
the lack of oversight that allowed the BP oil spill to occur illus-
trates what could happen in the Arctic without proper regula-
tion by the AC.26 Furthermore, the AC has emerged as the key 
platform for the indigenous tribes of the Arctic to voice their 
concerns.27 Without a proper oversight mechanism, these indig-
enous tribes will lose a key forum for ensuring their negotiating 
parity with the member-nations.28 Therefore, it is imperative for 
the AC to develop environmentally conscious standards for fos-
sil fuel extraction to protect the Arctic environment under the 
Ottawa Declaration. If the AC fails to do so, then it risks becom-
ing an obsolete and ineffectual organization. 
The AC should also create mechanisms that will enforce 
the member-nations’ Ottawa commitments and environmental 
regulations for oil and gas development in the Arctic. However, 
since the AC is a “cooperative” group it currently has no bind-
ing enforcement authority.29 Therefore, the first step must be 
the establishment of the AC’s binding powers, .30 Without the 
essential ability to enforce its resolutions, the AC has no mecha-
nism through which it can ensure that its member-nations do 
not act in contradiction with the AC’s core missions. However, 
given their support for fossil fuel development in the Arctic, 
it is unlikely that the AC member-nations will voluntary cre-
ate a new regulatory authority in the region. Thus action must 
come from the international community, who —through the 
“permanent-observer” nations—must apply pressure on the AC 
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adoption of the forthcoming Basin Plan and eventual compliance 
with its standards.42 The MDBA faces the challenge of redirecting 
policy toward a future of sustainable water use that recognizes the 
vulnerability of the communities that will be affected most.43 As 
the Guide’s proposals are integrated into the forthcoming Basin 
Plan, the MDBA must show MDB communities how their input 
has been incorporated and how the central government’s policy 
decisions have the communities’ interests at heart.44 As proposed 
by the Guide, the Basin Plan, and its implementation, must provide 
a viable framework for balancing these considerations in order to 
ensure future water resource security, economic stability, and nec-
essary environmental rehabilitation.45
water crisis iN the murray-darliNg BasiN: australia attemPts to 
BalaNce agricultural Need with eNviroNmeNtal reality 
by Joshua Axelrod
  continued from page 12
the development of an island-wide master plan has been in the 
works for many years, but has been repeatedly delayed.21 This 
legacy of poor planning has fostered the island’s chronic sprawl, 
causing increased consumption of land even as population growth 
has slowed.22 By drafting and enacting a long-range master plan 
focused on resolving the island’s inefficient land use patterns and 
prioritizing natural resource conservation, policymakers have 
an opportunity to reverse this trend. Accompanied by transpar-
ency, public participation and gubernatorial accountability, the 
approval of a comprehensive master plan could represent the best 
hope of protecting finite natural resources and promoting sustain-
able economic development on one of the world’s most densely 
populated islands.23
weak PlaNNiNg Process frustrates ProtectioN of Puerto rico’s 
threateNed coastliNe 
by Mark Borak
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member-nations to establish the organization’s binding powers. The 
permanent-observer nations should argue that the impacts of fossil 
fuel development are of global concern and affect all nations.31 
Therefore, proper safety and environmental standards are needed 
to ensure stable and sustainable development of the Arctic’s natu-
ral resources, a goal to which the AC is already committed. 
The permanent-observer nations should also seek more influ-
ence on the affairs of the AC in relation to fossil fuel develop-
ment. Without usurping the position of the member-nations, the 
permanent-observer nations should demand some limited voting 
rights when the AC wishes to enact binding resolutions. Providing 
the permanent-observer nations with voting rights would allow 
more countries to voice their priorities and concerns, which may 
force the AC member-nations to consider the implications of their 
fossil fuel development plans on the global community. 
If the AC member-states wish to take advantage of the ben-
efits of climate change in the Arctic, they should do so in a manner 
that also honors their Ottawa commitments and the AEPS. The 
international community, then, should pressure the AC to make 
changes to its structure and provide effective oversight of fossil 
fuel extraction in the Arctic. In turn, the AC should respond by 
making the Ottawa Declaration binding and enforceable upon 
member-nations, allocating voting power to the permanent-
observer nations, and effectuating the needed regulations. 
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1 See 1 george saNtayaNa, Reason in Common Sense, in Vol. 1 the life of 
reasoN 284 (1905), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15000/15000-h/vol1.html. 
2 According to the Merriam-Webster’s dictionary “land grab” means “a usu-
ally swift acquisition of property often by fraud or force.” Land Grab Definition, 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/land-
grab (last visited Nov. 18, 2011). There have been countless land grabs throughout 
history, two of the most notable are “Manifest Destiny” and “The Scramble for 
Africa.” See id. The Cambridge dictionary further defines “land grab” as “the act 
of taking an area of land by force, for military or economic reasons.” Land Grab 
Definition, Cambridge Dictionaries Online, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dic-
tionary/business-english/land-grab (last visited Nov. 18, 2011). 
3 See The Arctic is Poised to be Oil’s Final Frontier, seekiNg alPha (Sept. 
28, 2011), http://seekingalpha.com/article/296430-the-arctic-is-poised-to-be-
oil-s-final-frontier [hereinafter Oil’s Final Frontier]; Sergey Andaykin, Large 
Russian Interest for Arctic Licenses, BareNts oBserver (Oct. 24, 2011), http://
www.barentsobserver.com/index.php?id=4976120&cat=116320&printable=1; 
see generally Peter F. Johnston, Arctic Energy Resources and Global Energy 
Security, 12 J. mil. & strategic stud., no. 2 (2010) (citing various efforts by 
arctic nations, through political and commercial entities, to explore the oceans 
and continental shelf in the Arctic and to stake their claim to any resources). 
4 There is no certain way to know the amount of oil and natural gas available 
in the Arctic formations because methodologies of estimation are so varied. 
Figures range wildly from 44 billion to 157 billion barrels of oil (13% of the 
world’s undiscovered supply), and 770 trillion cubic feet to 2,990 trillion cubic 
feet of natural gas (approx. 30% of the world’s undiscovered natural gas). See 
Johnston, supra note 3, at 2-4. 
5 See Oil’s Final Frontier, supra note 3 (citing technological feasibility of  
exploration in the Arctic by the world’s larger oil companies like Exxon 
and Rosneft); Christoph Siedler, Taking Stock of North Pole Riches, 
sPeigel oNliNe (Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.spiegel.de/international/
world/0,1518,druck-648197,00.html (discussing the technological feasibility 
of oil and gas development in the Arctic); Duncan E.J. Currie, Sovereignty and 
Conflict in the Arctic Due to Climate Change: Climate Change and the Legal 
Status of the Arctic Ocean, gloBelaw.com (Aug. 5, 2007), http://www.globe-
law.com/LawSea/Climate_Change_and_Arctic_Sovereignty.html (providing 
evidence about the changing environmental factors that lead to political con-
flicts and negotiations over sovereignty of the Arctic).
6 See Oil’s Final Frontier, supra note 3; see also Siedler, supra note 5 (dis-
cussing increased interest in the Arctic by large oil companies and geological 
studies and surveys that speak to the technical and economic feasibility of tap-
ping into the Arctic fossil fuel reserves). 
7 See Johnston, supra note 3, at 1, 18-20 (discussing the concerns about the 
global availability of oil and natural gas, China’s increasing demands for fossil 
fuels, and the hope/expectation that Arctic reserves will alleviate the strain on 
global supplies). 
8 See Currie, supra note 5 (noting reductions in ice sheet and permafrost 
cover, and other drastic changes to the Arctic environmental as a result of 
changing climates that provides access to shipping channels and other com-
mercial development in the Arctic); liNda NowlaN, arctic legal regime for 
eNviroNmeNtal ProtectioN, iNterNatioNal uNioN for coNservatioN of Nature 
aNd Natural resources 2-3 (2001) (showing further evidence of melting ice 
and increasing temperatures in the Arctic).
9 See NowlaN, supra note 8, at 9-10 (discussing the impetus behind the cre-
ation of the Arctic Council). 
10 The eight original member nations are the United States, Canada, Russia, 
Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. See Lev Levit, About Us: 
Member States, Arctic Council (Jul. 29 2011), http://www.arctic-council.org/
index.php/en/about-us. The eight original member states have voting power 
and discretion over all matters and initiatives discussed by the Arctic Council. 
See Arctic Council Rules of Procedure: General Provisions Rule 7, arctic 
couNcil (Sept. 17-18, 1998), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/
documents/category/4-founding-documents (download Arctic Counsel Rules of 
Procedure) [hereinafter Rules of Procedure].
11 The permanent-observer nations are France, Germany The Netherlands, 
Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. See About Us: Observers, arctic 
couNcil (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/
partners-links. 
12 Nowhere in the Rules of Procedure adopted by the Arctic Council, does it 
provide for voting rights to Observers, but the rules do allow for Observers to 
submit statements at Ministerial Meetings of the Council. Therefore, by nega-
tive implication, there are no voting rights allotted to Observer Nations. Also, to 
obtain the status of “Observer” the Council implicitly determines that the sub-
ject observer has sometime to contribute to the Council, therefore participation 
is essential and encouraged. See generally Rules of Procedure, supra note 10.
13 See About the Arctic Council, Arctic Council (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.
arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us [hereinafter About the Arctic Council]. 
14 Id. 
15 See Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Sept. 19, 
1996), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/4-
founding-documents [hereinafter Ottawa Declaration]. 
16 See NowlaN, supra note 8, at 9-16.
17 The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (“AEPS”) was a non-binding 
declaration made five years before the creation of the Arctic Council. Most 
if not all of the member-nations of the AC were present and signed on to the 
AEPS, which makes affirmative commitments to investigate, mitigate, and 
protect the Arctic against the effects of pollution brought on by fossil fuel 
development (among other things). See Arctic Environmental Protection Strat-
egy, U.S.-Can.-Russ.-Fin.-Ice.-Nor.-Swed.-Den., at 2-4, 9-10, 14-15, Jun. 14, 
1991,http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/file/53-aeps 
(download Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy). The Arctic Council is 
often seen as the outgrowth of AEPS, and was by many accounts expected to 
further the goals of AEPS. See NowlaN, supra note 8, at 9. Therefore, the AC 
goals of “sustainable development” must have some nexus with the environ-
mental aims of AEPS. It is not unreasonable to expect the AC to have some 
interest in regulating the development of fossil fuels in the Arctic. 
18 See NowlaN, supra note 8, at 9, 11, 15-16 (discussing the impetus behind 
the creation of the Arctic Counsel, analyzing the effectiveness of the Council in 
light of barriers to funding and decision-making power, and the inherent tension 
between environmental concerns and sustainable development that predominate 
the Council’s dialogue.) 
19 See Robert Sibley, China Enters the Arctic Equation, Postmedia News 
(Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.canada.com/news/China+enters+Arctic+equat
ion/5625499/story.html (discussing the speech and support expressed by the 
Danish Ambassador in his latest speech in Beijing). 
20 Specifically, Sibley wrote, “Some suggest the Danish ambassador was not 
only trying to leverage Denmark’s influence in the Arctic Council, but soliciting 
Chinese investment to help the Danes exploit Greenland’s natural resources. 
And from China’s perspective, they say, the ambassador’s remarks reflect  
China’s interest in gaining access to resources and increasing its geopoliti-
cal clout.” See id. (citing noted scholars and analysts from the University of 
Calgary who have tracked China’s increased interest in Arctic resources and 
China’s questioning of Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage). 
21 See generally goverNmeNt of caNada, statemeNt oN caNada’s arctic 
foreigN Policy: exercisiNg sovereigNty aNd PromotiNg caNada’s NortherN 
strategy aBroad, goverNmeNt of caNada (2010), http://www.international.
gc.ca/polar-polaire/canada_arctic_foreign_policy_booklet-la_politique_etran-
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broad, and sweeping assertions about Canadian rights to sovereignty in certain 
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22 See Toni Johnson, Thawing Arctic’s Resource Race, couNcil oN foreigN 
relatioNs (Aug. 9, 2007), http://www.cfr.org/arctic/thawing-arctics-resource-
race/p13978 (last visited Nov. 19, 2011) (discussing the move to place a flag, 
and the subsequent “research team” that went out to prove that the Arctic’s 
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23 exec. office of the PresideNt, u.s. arctic regioN Policy (2009), https://
rapidlychanginarctic.custompublish.com/getfile.php/868102.1463.wfsxdypcyp/
US+Arctic+Policy+2009.pdf [hereinafter Combined Strategies for the Arctic]. 
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AC and the other articles cited in this piece evidence the strong expectation 
among the global community that the fossil fuel reserves will be developed.  
See id. 
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Endnotes: threats to a sustaiNaBle future: water accumulatioN aNd coNflict iN latiN america
  continued from page 45
1 Jan Hendriks, Water Laws, Collective Rights and System Diversity in 
Andean Countries, in out of the maiNstream: water rights, Politics, aNd 
ideNtity 168-71 (Rutgerd Boelens et al. eds. 2010).
2 Anthony Bebbington et al., Federating and Defending: Water, Terri-
tory and Extraction in the Andes, in out of the maiNstream. water rights, 
Politics aNd ideNtity 320 (Rutgerd Boelens et al. eds., 2010); kate Berry & 
eric mollard, social ParticiPatioN iN water goverNaNce aNd maNagemeNt: 
critical aNd gloBal PersPectives (Routledge 2009).
3 See generally Jose Esteban Castro, Water Struggles, Citizenship and  
Governance in Latin America, 51 develoPmeNt, 72 (2008) (exploring some  
of the trends and problems that have arisen in Latin America surrounding water 
access).
4 Id. at 75; Paul h. gelles, water aNd Power iN highlaNd Peru: the  
cultural Politics of irrigatioN aNd develoPmeNt (Rutgers Univ. Press 2000); 
Antonio Gaybor, Acumulación en el campo y despojo del agua en el Ecuador, 
in Justicia hídrica: acumulacióN, coNflictos y accióN civil 195-208 (Rutg-
erd Boelens et al. eds. 2011).
5 uNited NatioNs eNviroNmeNt Programme, Climate Change Hits Hard  
on Latin America and the Caribbean, (Apr. 6, 2007), http://www.unep.org/ 
documents.multilingual/default.asp? documentid=504&articleid=5558&l=en.
6 Francisco Pena, Acumulación de Derechos de Agua y Justicia Hídrica en 
Mexico: El Poder de Las Elites, in Justicia hídrica: acumulacióN, coNflictos 
y accióN civil 209-22 (Rutgerd Boelens et al. eds. 2011)
7 Id.; see also Erik Swyngedouw, Dispossessing H20: The Contested  
Terrain of Water Privatization, 16 caPitalism Nature socialism 81, 81-98 
(2005); kareN Bakker, BeyoNd PrivatizatioN: water, goverNaNce, citizeNshiP  
(2010); miguel solaNes & aNdrei Jouravlev, comisióN ecoNómica Para 
américa latiNa y el cariBe (u.N. cePal), recursos Naturales e iNfraestruc-
tura: water goverNaNce for develoPmeNt aNd sustaiNaBility 22-25 (2006).
8 u.N. cePal, Recursos Naturales e Infraestructura, dministración del agua 
en America Latina y el Caribe en elumbral del siglo XXI, 12, (July 2001) (by 
Andrei Jouravlev).
9 Swyngedouw, supra note 7, at 93; Julio f. alegria, coNflicts aNd water 
maNagemeNt iN Peru iN the coNtext of climate chaNge 9-10 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.iproga.org.pe/boletin/bol2041/JulioAlegria.pdf.
10 Hendriks, supra note 1, at 17-72; Mourik Bueno de Mesquita, Agua,  
concentración de recursos naturales y conflictos en el Perú, in Justicia 
hídrica: acumulacióN, coNflictos y accióN civil 179-94 (Rutgerd Boelens  
et al. eds. 2011).
11 Swyngedouw, supra note 7, at 91.
12 Rutgerd Boelens & Margreet Zwarteven, Prices and Politics in Andean 
Water Reforms, 36 develoPmeNt aNd chaNge 735, 735-58; Bakker, supra note 
7.
13 Hendricks, supra note 1, at 168-71.
14 Swyngedouw, supra note 7, at 82.
15 Id. at 83-84.
16 Pena, supra note 6, at 214.
17 Id. at 85 (discussing the establishment of regulatory bodies and the subse-
quent budgetary issues that led to inefficient operation).
18 Rutgerd Boelens, The Politics of Disciplining Water Rights, 40 develoP-
meNt aNd chaNge, 307, 315-18 (2009) [hereinafter Water Rights].
19 Id. at 313-14.
20 Boelens & Zwarteven, supra note 12, at 739-44.
21 Castro, supra note 3, at 73; Bebbington et al., supra note 2, at 313.
22 Bebbington, supra note 2, at 307-31.
23 Rutgerd Boelens, Armando Guevara-Gil & Aldo Panfichi, Indigenous 
Water Rights in the Andes: Struggles Over Resources and Legitimacy 20 the 
JourNal of water law 268, 275-76. [hereinafter Indigenous Water Rights].
24 Id. at 317.
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., aNtoiNette hilderiNg, International Law, Sustainable Develop-
ment and Water Management (2004); see, e.g., ecoNomic commissioN for 
euroPe, 45th Sess., Charter on Ground-Water Management, E/ECE/1197 ECE/
ENVWA/12 (1989) available at http://www.inter nationalwaterlaw.org/docu-
ments/regionaldocs/groundwater_charter.html.
27 hilderiNg, supra note 26.
28 James Keese, International NGOs and Land Use Change in a Southern 
Highland Region of Ecuador, 26 hum. ecology 451, 464-66 (1998); Carols 
Larrea & Lisa L. North, Adjustment Policy Impacts on Truncated Development 
and Democratisation, 18 third world Q. 913, 915-29 (1997); See generally 
Victoria A. Lawson, Government Policy Biases and Ecuadorian Agricultural 
Change, 78 aNNals ass’N am. geograPhers 433, 434-49 (1988).
29 Gaybor, supra note 4, at 197-99.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 199.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 200.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.; Leontien Cremers et al, Institutional Reform in the Andean Irrigation 
Sector: Enabling Policies for Strengthening Local Rights and Water Manage-
ment, 29 Natural resources forum 37, 41 (2005).
45 Gaybor, supra note 4, at 200; Julio A. Berdegue & Ricardo Fuentealba, 
Latin America: The State of Smallholders in Agriculture at 20 (2011).
46 Gaybor, supra note 4, at 200.
47 Id.
